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ABSTRACT 
Unlike current closed systems such as 2nd and 3rd generations where the core network is controlled by a 
sole network operator, multiple network operators will coexist and manage the core network in Next 
Generation Networks (NGNs). This open architecture and the collaboration between different network 
operators will support ubiquitous connectivity and thus enhances users’ experience. However, this brings 
to the fore certain security issues which must be addressed, the most important of which is the initial 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) to identify and authorize mobile nodes on these various 
networks. This paper looks at how existing research efforts the HOKEY WG, Mobile Ethernet and 3GPP 
frameworks respond to this new environment and provide security mechanisms. The analysis shows that 
most of the research had realized the openness of the core network and tried to deal with it using different 
methods. These methods will be extensively analysed in order to highlight their strengths and weaknesses. 
KEYWORDS 
Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols, Casper/FDR, Next Generation Networks, Heterogeneous 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Future networks is a convergence of different access networks controlled by multiple operators 
such as 2G/3G, WiMax and the Long Term Evolution (LTE) [1] [2] as the newest wireless 
technologies being developed and deployed.  However with the wide-scale deployment of 
wireless networks as end-systems, there will now be significant differences in network 
characteristics in terms of bandwidth, latency, packet loss and error characteristics. These 
developments mean that, soon it will not be possible to think of the Internet as a single unified 
infrastructure. It would be better to view the Internet as comprising of a fast core network with 
slower peripheral networks attached around the core. The core network will consist of a super-
fast backbone using optical switches and fast access networks which is mainly based on wired 
technologies such as Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS). Due to the fact that, the 
connectivity in the peripheral networks will be based on a wide variety of wireless technologies, 
provided by different operators, various network operators need to cooperate and coexist in the 
core network. 
Unlike current communication systems such as 2G and 3G, which introduce closed 
environments where the core network is controlled and owned by sole network operator and 
thus its security is mainly based on the assumption that, the core network is physically secure, 
the above discussion highlights the fact that we are moving towards an open, heterogeneous 
environment where the core network is not controlled by a single operator, so multiple operators 
will have to cooperate.  Furthermore, in this environment, new networks providers might choose 
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to join the network and share the spectrum. This introduces dynamic network architecture in 
contrast to the static current architecture. 
This new open and dynamic architecture will bring about new security threats such as initially 
authenticating the mobile nodes in this environment as well as in the case of handover. The 
latter issue has been under investigation by different research groups such [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8], 
[9]. However, few research efforts such as the [6] [10] [11] [3] have considered the initial 
authentication of the Mobile Terminal (MT) in heterogeneous environments.  
Most of the previous work realized the openness and dynamic nature of the future networks and 
have been trying to deal with these issues using different methods. In [11], the authors presumed 
to have the UMTS infrastructure as a backbone of the core network, while different networks 
such as WLAN and WiMax could be attached to it. Obviously, this solution does not go along 
with the open architecture of future networks. Other works such as [3] proposed to use a 
common platform such as the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [12] to run their 
security mechanisms on top of it and thus hiding the difference between different operators. 
Other solutions have been proposed by the Mobile Ethernet Group in [6] and the Zhing et al, 
[10] that attempted to address the previous drawbacks by adopting a generic network structure, 
which is close to an open architecture, and by introducing novel protocols. Due to the fact that, 
the security protocol in [6] adopts a generic network structure, this protocol will be analysed 
and verified using formal methods approach. The verification results discovered some security 
breaches in the deployment of the Mobile Ethernet's Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) 
protocol, which highlight the need for a new AKA protocol.       
Communication Sequential Processes (CSP) [13] is a formal language to describe the 
interaction and states in concurrent systems, it has been used to model communicating and 
security protocols as in [14] and [15]. To verify the CSP models, model checkers such as the 
Failure Divergence Refinement (FDR) are used. Although modelling and verifying security 
protocols using CSP and FDR have proven to be effective and widely deployed, modelling 
directly in CSP is a time-consuming and error-prone. Therefore, a new compiler for generating 
the CSP description of the protocol was designed by Lowe in [16].  The new compiler is called 
Casper and it accepts an abstract description of a system and translates it into CSP. This paper 
will model the security properties of the proposed protocols using Casper and analyse the CSP 
output with FDR. 
The contribution of this work is as follows: Firstly, analysing a number of the AKA protocols 
for heterogeneous networks namely, the ones proposed by the Zhing et al, the HOKEY,  Mobile 
Ethernet and 3GPP projects. Secondly, using Casper/FDR, we formally model and analyse the 
initial AKA protocol of the Mobile Ethernet [6]. Thirdly, we analyse the attacks found by 
Casper/FDR, and verify the security properties of the protocol. Fourthly, based on the 
performed analysis, we highlight the main source of security threats and propose some 
recommendations to address them. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the open architecture of the 
future, heterogeneous networks in terms of its operational components as well as the QoS 
signalling models as introduced by [17]. The section also describes some related work to 
address the initial authentication in this environment. Since the Mobile Ethernet framework 
considers open network architecture, Section 3 explains the initial AKA protocol of the Mobile 
Ethernet [6] and verifies the protocol using Casper/FDR. The verification results highlights the 
need for a new AKA protocol. Section 4 explains and formally verifies the three refinement 
stages, which led to the final version of the protocol. The paper concludes in Section 5. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF FUTURE NETWORKS 
In Next Generation Networks, multiple operators have to cooperate in order to provide 
continuous connectivity. However, since each network operator uses different network 
architecture, interoperability might be a key challenge. One proposed solution for this problem 
is having a central management entity to control the resource of the different networks and 
coordinate the multiple operators. In this regard, the concept of a central management entity was 
recommended by the ITU-T recommendation [18] for Next Generation Networks (NGNs). The 
recommendation proposes the concept of the Regulatory Authority as central management 
entity which controls different network operators and service providers. 
 
Figure 1. The Architecture of Future Internet 
This concept of a central management entity was adopted and enhanced by the Y-Comm group 
[19] and Daidalos II [20] which introduced the concept of the Core End-Point (CEP) in [17]. As 
shown in Fig 1, the future Internet could be viewed as composed of several Core End-Points, 
interconnected over the super-fast backbone of the Internet. Each CEP is responsible for 
managing multiple, wireless peripheral networks such as Wimax, WiFi or mobile technologies 
in a local context. 
3. AKA PROTOCOLS IN HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS 
This section describes some of the related work towards introducing AKA protocols for the 
initial registration in heterogeneous environments. 
3.1. AKA and Authorization Scheme Based on Trusted Mobile Platform 
The work in [10] has introduced an AKA and authorization scheme to achieve mutual 
authentication between the user, Mobile Terminal and the SIM card. This scheme deploys 
passwords in combination with biometric information and Public key Infrastructure (PKI), the 
scheme also benefits from the Trusted Mobile Platform (TMP) [21] to guarantee the internal 
integrity of the mobile device.  As explained in [10], the proposed scheme achieves many 
security features such as mutual authentication, protection on wired links as well as resistant to 
replay and man-in-middle attacks. However, the main drawbacks of the scheme are as follow: 
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• The scheme proposes using the PKI. However, this comes at the cost of a higher 
overhead especially in terms of key management and cryptographic operations [22] 
[30]. 
• Many security features of the scheme are based mainly on the hardware architecture of 
the trusted mobile platform; this implies that the proposed scheme is not generic and 
might not be compatible with none TMP-supported devices. 
3.2. AKA Protocol of the Handover Key Working Group (HOKEY WG) 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) handover keying working group (HOKEY WG) 
[3] is currently developing solutions to provide a secure, media-independent handover, also 
called inter-technology handover. The solutions are applicable to wireless access technologies 
based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [12] which is an authentication 
framework that supports multiple authentication protocols, these are referred to as EAP 
methods. Regardless of the method, the EAP key hierarchy derives two keys: the Master 
Session Key (MSK) and the Extended MSK (EMSK) which are used by different methods to 
derive further keys.  
Based on EAP's terminology, three entities are defined: The EAP peer which is the client asking 
for authentication using an  EAP method, the EAP Server which is an entity that terminates the 
EAP authentication method with the peer; the EAP servers are often, but not necessarily, co-
located with Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) servers. And finally, the 
EAP authenticator which is the network Access Point that supports the authentication 
functionality and enforces access control based on the authentication result. 
When a mobile terminal (MT) moves between different authenticators, it is desirable to avoid a 
full EAP authentication to support fast handover. Therefore, the HOKEY group proposed a new 
method for the EAP known as EAP Re-Authentication Protocol (ERP) [23] which will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
This group is concerned with providing a set of protocols and mechanisms to secure handover. 
It has introduced an abstract mechanism for delivering root keys from an Extensible 
Authentication Protocol EAP [12] server to another network server that requires the keys for 
offering security protected services, such as re- authenticating the EAP-supporting peer using 
the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [23]. The ERP protocol mainly considers the case of 
handover, and recommends full EAP for initial authentication. However, in either case, the 
solution is based on the assumption that all access networks support the EAP framework, this 
assumption might not be feasible in heterogeneous networks since the EAP severs might belong 
to different operators. 
3.2.2. An Overview of the ERP Protocol  
The ERP is a new extension to EAP to support an EAP method-independent protocol for 
efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication (ER) server [23]. It is 
assumed that, the ER server is collocated with an Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting and Cost (A3C) server [24].  
Initially, the MT performs a full normal EAP authentication with the A3C server in its home 
network. As a result of this authentication, the EAP's keys namely, Master Session Key (MSK) 
and (Extended Master Session Key) EMSK are derived. However, when the MT roams, the 
ERP extension is used to achieve authentication between the MT and the ERP-Server in the 
target network instead of performing a full EAP authentication. This process is referred to as 
pre-authentication because the keying materials will be launched in the target network before 
the MT actually joins and it comprises: 
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For the MT to use the ERP protocol with the access point in the target network, it needs to 
derive a new re-authentication root key, this key is derived using the EMSK and the domain 
name of the target network and hence, is called the Domain Specific Root Key (DSRK). Using 
this key, further domain specific keys such as the DsIK and DSr, MSKs are derived; these will 
be used to secure the connection between the MT and the network. Additionally, proving the 
possession of derived keys helps in achieving authentication between the MT and the network. 
To provide security without disturbing the handover procedure, the ERP achieves low latency 
handover by launching the keying materials in the target network before the actual handover 
takes place. Furthermore, the ERP introduces additional keys shown in Fig 2; these are defined 
in [23] as follows:  
The rRK - re-authentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK. 
The rIK - re-authentication Integrity Key, derived from the rRK. 
The rMSK - re-authentication MSK.  This is a per-authenticator key, derived from the rRK and 
is delivered to the authenticator. 
 
Figure 2. The Key Hierarchy of the ERP Protocol 
 
3.2.2. Analysis 
The HOKEY's work seemed fairly stable particularly in terms of keys hierarchy and it has 
influenced the direction of research when developing a Network-Level Authentication and Key 
Agreement (NL-AKA) protocol. However, the solutions for keys distribution are still being 
discussed by the HOKEY. Additionally, the ERP extension suffers from some drawbacks which 
are summarised as follows: 
• Although the ERP is based on the EAP platform, it introduces new messages such as 
EAP-Finish/Re-auth that includes a DSRK and the new domain name. This implies that, 
all the network entities such as the Access points have to be updated or replaced to 
support this extra message. 
• The EAP-Finish/Re-auth message is sent directly between the MT and the 
Authenticator in the new network. This message includes the domain name of the target 
network and is sent in an unprotected manner since there is no security agreement yet 
between the MT and the target network. 
• In the ERP protocol, the Mobile Terminal's home ERP server generates the keys and 
passes them to the ERP server in the target network. However, in case of heterogeneous 
environments, this might not be feasible since these ERP severs might belong to 
different operators. 
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3.3. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
The 3GPP group [4] has proposed the integration of 3GPP-WLAN and 3GPP-WiMAX as 
examples of heterogeneous networks. In both cases, the 3GPP recommends invoking EAP-AKA 
[25] for the initial authentication.  By integrating the 3GPP-AKA [11] protocol and the EAP 
platform, the EAP-AKA achieves many desired security features such as mutual authentication 
between the device and the network. 
One issue with this approach is that it is fully dependent on specific wireless technology, the 
3GPP core network in this case. Whoever wants to add a new wireless access to an existing 
network will always need to develop a method that integrates wireless access with the 3GPP 
core infrastructure. Additionally, the solution is based on implementing the EAP platform 
globally which requires all authentication severs to support the EAP. 
3.4. Security in the Mobile Ethernet Architecture 
Mobile Ethernet Architecture is a Beyond 3G network system for the all IP integrated network 
using MAC layer technologies [6]. The architecture is based on the Wide Area Ethernet (WAE) 
which is a virtual private network aimed at providing connectivity based on the Ethernet (MAC) 
addressing and thus achieves interoperability among different IP-based operators.  
For the Network-Level security, Mobile Ethernet has proposed AKA protocols for the initial 
and handover cases. The proposed protocols consider a generic structure for heterogeneous 
networks similar to the one in section 2, and since it operates at Layer 2 (L2), it does not require 
underlying platforms such as EAP and thus, could be used with any operator. Furthermore, as 
stated in [6], the initial AKA protocol achieves mutual authentication between the mobile 
terminal and the network and meet many desired security features. Also, this protocol is based 
on symmetric encryption which makes it less complex to implement for mobile devices. Due to 
these reasons, this paper will extensively analyse the AKA protocol of the Mobile Ethernet. 
However, to verify this protocol and make sure it is not vulnerable to security attacks, we use 
Casper to simulate the protocol and FDR as model checker as detailed in Section 4.2. 
3.4.1. Verifying Security Protocols Using Formal Methods and Casper/FDR Tool 
Previously, analysing security protocols used to go through two stages. Firstly, modelling the 
protocol using a theoretical notation or language such as Communication Sequential Processes 
(CSP) [13]. Secondly, verifying the protocol using a model checker such as Failures-Divergence 
Refinement (FDR) [26]. 
However, describing a system or a protocol using CSP is a quite difficult and error-prone task; 
therefore, Gavin Lowe [16] has developed the CASPER/FDR tool to model security protocols, 
it accepts a simple and human-friendly input file that describes the system and compiles it into 
CSP code which is then checked using the FDR model checker. CASPER's input file consists of 
eight headers as explained in Table 1: 
Table 1. The Headers of Casper's Input File 
The Header Description 
# Free Variables Defines the agents, variables and functions in the protocol 
# Processes Represents each agent as a process 
# Protocol Description Shows all the messages exchanged between the agents 
# Specification Specifies the security properties to be checked 
# Actual Variables Defines the real variables, in the actual system to be checked 
# Functions Defines all the functions used in the protocol 
# System Lists the agents participating in the actual system with their 
parameters instantiated 
# Intruder Information Specifies the intruder's knowledge and capabilities 
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3.4.2. Desired Security Features for AKA protocols 
As stated in [27], it is desired for AKA protocols to meet certain security properties. Therefore, 
a list of these properties will be used to analyse both the initial AKA protocol of [6] 
• Mutual Entity Authentication: This is achieved when each party is assured of the 
identity of the other party. 
• Mutual Key Authentication: This is achieved when each party is assured that no other 
party aside from a specifically identified second party gains access to a particular secret 
key. 
• Mutual Key Confirmation: This requirement means that each party should be assured 
that the other has possession of a particular secret key. 
• Key Freshness: A key is considered fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new and not 
reused through actions of either an adversary or authorized party. 
• Unknown-Key Share Resilience: In this attack the two parties compute the same 
session key but have different views of their peers in the key exchange. In other words, 
in this  attack an entity A ends up believing that it shares a key with B; although this is 
the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an entity E \= A. 
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This property implies that if the Intruder 
compromised the long-term key of one party, he should not be able to masquerade to 
the party as a different party. 
4. THE INITIAL AKA PROTOCOL FOR THE MOBILE ETHERNET 
This section presents a formal analysis of the Initial AKA protocol for Mobile Ethernet 
proposed by Masahiro et al [6], it deals with providing mutual authentication between the 
mobile device (M) and the network upon accessing the network for the first time. For this 
protocol, the security architecture consists of the following network components: 
• The Authentication Information Server (AIS): manages the subscriber's information in 
terms of authentication and authorization. 
• The Authentication Server (AS): authenticates the subscribers based on information 
retrieved from the AIS. 
• The Entry Points (EPs): represent one end point for wireless communication and 
represent Access Points (APs) or Access Routers (ARs). 
• The Mobile Device (M): is the mobile terminal accessing the network. 
4.1. The Protocol Description 
The initial AKA protocol of [6] is based on the challenge-response paradigm. By considering 
the notation in Table 2, the protocol goes as follows:  
Initially the mobile device (M) and the AIS pre-share User ID (UID) and user unique key 
(UUK). When the MD attaches to the access network, it sends its UID and a random number 
(R1) as a challenge all the way to the AS. The AS appends a freshly created random (R2) to the 
message and passes it to the AIS. Using the received UID, the AIS looks up in its database and 
finds the corresponding UUK, then it derives the Master Key (MS) and passes it along with the 
UID to the AS.  The received MS is used by the AS to derive the Authentication Key (AK) and 
the Secret key (SK), then the AS returns the challenge (R1) encrypted using the AK and a 
challenge R2 to the mobile device. If the Mobile device managed to derive the required keys, 
he should be able to verify the received message and compose the response. The AS checks 
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whether the Mobile device possessed the right keys and indicates the end of the authentication 
process by sending an acknowledgement message. 
Table 2. Notations 
The Notation Description 
M The Mobile Node 
AIS The Authentication Information Server 
AS The Authentication Server 
R1, R2 Random values 
E(K, Msg) Encrypted Msg by key K 
PRF, PRF2 Pseudo-random function 
MS Master Secret key MS = PRF(UUK, R1 | R2)  
AK Authentication Key AK = PRF(MS, R1 | R2)  
SK Secret Key used for encryption SK = PRF2(MS, R1 | R2) 
 
As could be figured out from Fig 3, this version of the protocol might be vulnerable to security 
threats, which are mainly due to the fact that the derived keys are insecurely distributed to the 
participating entities. Therefore, the authors in [6], have assumed that, the devices of the 
architecture are securely installed using mutual authentication and data integrity is maintained 
in the core network, i.e. between the AIS and the AS. Also, similar to current AKA protocols in 
current systems such as 2nd and 3rd Generations [28] [31], it is assumed that the intruder does 
not know the Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) used to generate the secret and authentication 
keys. By keeping these assumptions in mind, Casper/FDR tool was used to verify the protocol 
and find out whether it is still vulnerable to any attacks. A detailed analysis of the protocol is in 
the following sections. 
 
Figure 3. The Initial AKA Protocol of Mobile Ethernet 
 
4.2. The Formal Verification of the Mobile Ethernet Protocol 
As shown in Fig 3, it is not clear how the Mobile device knows about the Entry Point, this 
knowledge could not be pre-configured as there is no way to predict which EP the mobile 
device will use. Similarly, there is a need to justify why the mobile device starts the protocol by 
sending the the UID,R1 as the mobile device's first message. In order to simulate this 
interaction in Casper, we introduce the following preliminary messages: the Entry Points’ 
advertisement messages (Adv), The Access Request (AccReq) message, which is used by the 
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Mobile device to indicate its intention to access the network. The Authentication Request 
(AuthReq) message, sent by the Entry point to trigger the authentication process.  None of 
these messages play a security role; they are only used at the pre-authentication stage, where 
the entry points advertise their presence.  
To formally verify the protocol, a Casper/FDR's input file was prepared. The full input file is 
given in the Appendix A. However, for conciseness, we only describe the # Processes, the # 
Specification and the # Intruder Information headings, while the rest are mainly descriptive 
and of less significance in terms of verifying the protocol.  
The # Protocol Description section defines the protocol's messages. The notation {m}{k} 
means that the message (m) is encrypted using the key (k). Also, m%w denotes that the 
recipient of the message is not supposed to understand the message (m) instead; it should store 
it in a variable (w) and pass it along to the next recipient. In contrast, the notation w%m means 
that recipient should be able to encrypt the message (m), stored in the variable (w). 
The # Processes heading shows that our system comprises four parties: The M represented by 
the INITIATOR process, the Authenticator process corresponds to the EP; the last two 
processes namely, the DomainSERVER and CentralSERVER represent the AS and AIS 
respectively. For each process, the parameters- in the brackets- and variables after the keyword 
knows, define the agents' initial knowledge before running protocol. 
The security requirements of the system are defined under the # Specification heading. The 
lines starting with the keyword Secret define the secrecy properties of the protocol. The first 
line Secret(M,AK,[AS]) specifies the AK as a secret between the M and the AS. The lines 
starting with Agreement define the protocol's authenticity properties; for instance Agreement( 
M, AS, [R2])  specifies that, the Mobile device is correctly authenticated to the AS and using 
the random number R2. The Aliveness assertion checks the availability of the participants, e.g. 
the first Aliveness check Aliveness (EP, M) states that when M completes a run of the 
protocol, apparently with EP, then EP has previously been running the same protocol. Note that 
EP may have thought he was running the protocol with someone other than M. [16]. A stronger 
definition of the above Aliveness is specified by the Weak Agreement, for instance 
WeakAgreement(EP,M) assertion insists that M agreed he was running the protocol with EP. 
So the assertion could be interpreted as follows: if M has completed a run of the protocol with 
EP, then EP has previously been running the protocol, apparently with M. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The # Intruder Information heading specifies the Intruder identity, knowledge and capability. 
The first line identifies the Intruder as Mallory, the Intruder Knowledge defines the Intruder's 
initial knowledge i.e. we assume the intruder knows the identity of the participants and can 
generate its own unique key UUK(Mallory). The last two lines specify that all the keys of the 
Pre-shared keys and Domain specific key are crackable. In other words, the Crackable keyword 
tells Casper that, the following keys could be compromised by the intruder at any time of the 
protocol's run. 
# Specification 
Secret(M,AK,[AS])  
Secret(AS,AK,[M])  
Secret(M,SK,[AS, EP])  
Agreement( M, AS, [R2])  
Agreement(AS, M, [AK, R1])  
WeakAgreement (EP, M)  
WeakAgreement (M, EP)  
Aliveness (EP, M)  
Aliveness (M, EP)  
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After compiling the Casper model and feeding the CSP output to FDR, no attacks against the 
secrecy of the AK and SK keys were found; this is due to the assumption that the Intruder does 
not know the key derivation functions of these keys despite the fact that the Master Secret Key 
(MS) is sent unprotected. However, other attack was found against the Agreement( M, AS, 
[R2]) and Aliveness (EP, M) as shown in Fig 4. 
 
Figure 4. Checking the Mobile Ethernet Protocol using FDR model Checker 
 
We could find the traces for those attacks, which could be translated to the following attack 
sequence, where The notation I_M for instance represents the intruder taking the Mobile 
device's identity, either to fake a message (as in the second message 1) or to intercept a 
message intended for M (as in message 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0. -> M : EP, AIS, AS  
1a. M -> I_EP : accReq  
1b. I_M -> EP : accReq  
2a. EP -> I_M : authReq  
2b. I_EP -> M : authReq  
3. M -> I_EP : M, R1  
4. I_EP -> AS : M, R1, h(M, R1)  
5a. AS -> I_AIS : M, R1, R2, h(M, R1, R2)  
5b. I_AS -> AIS : M, R1, R2, h(M, R1, R2)  
6a. AIS -> I_AS : MS, M, h(MS, M)  
6b. I_AIS-> AS : MS, M, h(MS, M)  
7. AS -> I_EP : R2, {R1}{AK}, h(R2, {R1}{AK})  
8. I_EP -> M : {R1}{AK}, R2 
9. M -> I_EP : {R2}{AK} 
10. I_EP -> AS : {R2}{AK}, h({R2}{AK}) 
11. AS -> I_AIS : hoackm, h(hoackm)  
12. I_EP -> M : hoackm  
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The discovered attack could be depicted as in Fig 5 and explained as follows: 
• Initially, the intruder intercepts and replays the messages between the (M) and the (EP) 
as in messages 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b. Also, the intruder impersonates the Entry Point (I_EP) to 
intercept message 3 and fake message 4 towards the Authentication Server (AS). 
• Messages 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b between the AS and AIS are intercepted and passively 
replayed, Eventually, the intruder manages to get the new random (R2)  in message 7 
and then it impersonates the EP once the new random (R2) to run the protocol as 
messages 8,9, 11 and 12. 
In other words, this attack could be interpreted as follows:  The Mobile device (M) thinks he has 
successfully completed a run of the protocol apparently with EP, while in reality it is with the 
Intruder, and EP has not previously been running the protocol. 
4.3. Protocol Analysis and Security Consideration 
In this section, we discuss how our formal modelling with Casper allows checking the security 
requirements described in Section 3.4.2. 
 
Figure 5. The Discovered Attack 
• Mutual Entity Authentication: As stated in [27], entity authentication involves 
corroboration of a claimant's identity through actual communications with an associated 
verifier during execution of the protocol itself. Since the protocol does not consider 
verifying the identity of the participants and based on the discovered attack, we could 
claim that this protocol could not meet this feature. 
• Mutual Key Authentication: the mutual authentication between the M and the AS is 
based on the secrecy of the AK. We got Casper to check this using the Secret (M, AK, 
[AS]) and Secret (AS, AK, [M]) assertion checks. Since no attack was found against the 
key secrecy, this property is met. 
• Mutual Key Confirmation: Casper verifies this requirement by using the 
DECRYPTABLE (m, K) which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by the key 
(K). We performed a similar check after messages 8 and 10 as shown in the Protocol 
Description heading to verify that the valid Authentication key (AK) is possessed by the 
other party. If any of the checks fails the protocol aborts. 
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• Key Freshness: This property is guaranteed by including a fresh random value R1, R2 
in the key derivation functions of the keys MS, AK and SK. 
• Unknown Key Share Resilience: The afore-explained attack implies that the UKS was 
not met. Despite of the fact that, the mobile device (M) and the AS share the 
Authentication Key (AK), the M mistakenly believes that the intruder holds this key as 
well. Casper/FDR indicates this fact by highlighting an attack against the Agreement 
and Aliveness assertions in the # Specifications header. 
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: this property could be modelled by 
specifying the long-term keys as crackable and then checking the Authenticity 
assertions. Casper verifies no breach against the authenticity feature 
It is obvious from the discussion above that, the initial AKA protocol failed to meet some 
security requirements, which are mainly related to the discovered authentication attack in Fig 5. 
Although the protocol presumed the core network entities to be securely installed and the 
integrity of the exchanged messages to remain intact between the AIS and the AS, the fact that 
an attack could still be discovered could be due to the Intruder managing to intercept the 
connections in the core network. This raises the issue of the need for providing a better security 
in the core network. Initially, the core network has been assumed to be physically secure, this 
assumption was valid in the closed, homogeneous environments, where the core network was 
controlled by a sole operator. However, this assumption does not hold in the case of future 
networks, where the core network represents open, multi-operators environments. Additionally, 
there is a need to deal with identification-related attacks to meet the Mutual Entity 
Authentication property.   
Furthermore, the process of deriving the keying materials in the Initial AKA protocol of [6] 
does not define the keys' usability scope. Therefore, there is a need to propose a more stable key 
hierarchy that specifies the scope of each derived keys. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper discussed several research efforts, which have been trying to address the issue of 
authenticating the mobile nodes when they initially join the heterogeneous environment. The 
discussion showed that most of the solutions had realized the threats resulting from the open 
nature of future networks and as a result different approaches were proposed. Some solutions 
tried to conceal the divergence of the core network either by considering a specific technology 
as a backbone of the core network, or by deploying a common framework on top of which 
security protocols could be installed and run. The Mobile Ethernet group proposed a new AKA, 
which considers an open network architecture.  Analysing and verifying the Mobile Ethernet's 
AKA protocol using Casper/FDR shows that the protocol is vulnerable to an authentication 
attack. Also, the protocol failed to meet some desired security properties, which could be 
ascribed to the lack of security in the core network. Hence, this work shows that as the core of 
the network is opened, more attacks will be possible on network entities that previously were 
protected in closed environments. 
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APPENDIX 
A: Code for Formal Analysis of the Initial AKA Protocol for Mobile Ethernet 
# Free Variables 
 
M: MobileTerminal  
EP : AccessRouterAuthenticator  
AS : DomainA3CServer  
AIS : CentralA3CServer  
AuthID : Identity  
Initauth : Flags  
R1 : initialSeq   
R2 : Sequence  
UUK : MobileTerminal-> PresharedKeys  
AK : AuthenticationKeys  
SK : SecretKeys  
MS: Domainspecifickey  
RPF: PresharedKeys x initialSeq -> Domainspecifickey  
rpf: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey ->  AuthenticationKeys  
F3: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey -> SecretKeys  
h : HashFunction  
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages  
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage  
InverseKeys = (AK, AK), (UUK, UUK) , (SK, SK),  (MS, MS), (RPF,RPF), (rpf,rpf),(F3,F3) 
 
# Processes 
INITIATOR(M, EP, R1,AuthID,Initauth, AccReq, AuthReq) knows UUK(M)  
Authenticator(EP,M,AS, AuthReq, Adv,AccRes)  
DomainSERVER(AS,AIS, R2, HoAckm)  
CentralSERVER(AIS) knows UUK(M)  
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# Protocol Description 
 
0. -> M : EP, AIS, AS  
1. M -> EP: AccReq  
2. EP -> M : AuthReq  
< MS := RPF(UUK(M), R1);/  
AK:= rpf(R1, MS)>  
3. M -> EP : M,R1  
4. EP -> AS : M,R1, h(M,R1)  
5. AS -> AIS : M,R1, R2, h(M,R1,R2)  
< MS := RPF(UUK(M), R1)>  
6. AIS -> AS : MS,M, h(MS, M)  
< AK:= rpf(R1, MS)>  
7. AS -> EP: R2,({R1}{AK}%z)%x, h(R2,({R1}{AK}%z)%x)  
8. EP -> M : x%({R1}{AK}%z), R2  
[decryptable(z, AK)and nth(decrypt(z, AK), 1) == R1] 
<SK:= F3(R1, MS)> 
9. M -> EP : ({R2}{AK}%y)%q  
10. EP -> AS: (q%{R2}{AK})%y, h((q%{R2}{AK})%y)  
[ decryptable(y, AK)and nth(decrypt(y,AK), 1) == R2] 
<SK:= F3(R1, MS)> 
11. AS -> EP :HoAckm, h(HoAckm)  
12. EP -> M : HoAckm  
 
# Specification 
 
Secret(M,AK,[AS])  
Secret(AS,AK,[M])  
Secret(M,SK,[AS, EP])  
Agreement( M, AS, [R2])  
Agreement(AS, M, [AK, R1]) 
WeakAgreement (EP, M)  
WeakAgreement (M, EP)  
Aliveness (EP, M)  
Aliveness (M, EP)  
 
# Actual Variables 
m, Eve: MobileTerminal  
ep : AccessRouterAuthenticator  
as : DomainA3CServer  
ais : CentralA3CServer  
Authid : Identity  
InitAuth : Flags  
r1 : initialSeq  
r2 : Sequence  
ak : AuthenticationKeys  
sk : SecretKeys  
ms: Domainspecifickey  
accReq, accRes,authReq, adv: Messages  
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hoackm : AcknowledgementMessage  
InverseKeys = (ms, ms), (ak, ak), (sk, sk) 
 
# Functions 
symbolic UUK, RPF, rpf, F3 
 
# System 
INITIATOR(m,ep, r1,Authid,InitAuth, accReq, authReq)  
Authenticator(ep,m,as, authReq,adv, accRes)  
DomainSERVER(as,ais, r2,hoackm)  
CentralSERVER(ais)  
# Intruder Information 
Intruder = Eve  
IntruderKnowledge = {m, as, Eve, ais, Authid, ep, UUK(Eve)}  
Crackable = PresharedKeys  
Crackable = Domainspecifickey  
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